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Abstract 
This paper reflects on the nature of law reform as carried out by law commissions. This is in the 
context of the author’s experience in the Northern Ireland Law Commission. The paper assesses the 
importance of independence in any law reform body and the particular impact which law 
commissioners may bring to the law reform process. The paper looks at the history of law reform in 
Northern Ireland leading to the establishment of the Commission with a brief overview of the work of 
the Commission. The conclusion is that there is a role for effective law reform driven by commissioner 
led independent law commissions.1 
 
1. The Northern Ireland Law Commission 
I must of course, as a former Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Law Commission (‘NILC’ 
or ‘the Commission’), start with a disclaimer: I do not purport to speak on behalf of the Commission 
and it is for others to judge the success or otherwise of the work of the Commission during my period 
of office from 2008 to 2012. 
The original legislative base for NILC was in sections 50 to 52 of the Justice (Northern 
Ireland) Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’). This established the Commission as a body corporate and the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had the duty to appoint a chairman (a High Court judge) and 
four other Commissioners. 
Matters took their due course and a Commencement Order in 2007 commenced on 16 April 
20072 the relevant provisions of the 2002 Act. The Chairman was appointed in 2007 and the 
Commissioners were appointed in 2008. 
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had her role under the 2002 Act because at that 
time the functions of policing and justice had not been devolved to Northern Ireland. By the time of the 
commencement of the Commission’s work in 2008 the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland: 
Assembly and Executive were fully functioning, but the political parties in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly did not agree on the terms for the devolution of policing and justice until 2011. Thereupon 
the powers and duties of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland were transferred to the new 
Department of Justice for Northern Ireland (‘DoJ’ or ‘the Department’) and the 2002 Act was duly 
amended.3 
 
2. How law commissions operate 
There is not space to set out in detail the powers and functions of the Commission. It may 
suffice to say that NILC has in general powers and functions similar to those of the Law Commission 
for England and Wales, the Scottish Law Commission and the Law Reform Commission which 
operates in the Republic of Ireland. Indeed, I would understand that the following powers and 
                                                          
1 This paper was up to date on 23 September 2014. 
2 The Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 (Commencement No. 12) Order SRNI 2007 No. 237 C. 14 
3 The Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Devolution of Policing and Justice Functions) Order 2010 SI 2010/976 
Neil Faris Law Commissions – what is the essence of their law reform role? 
IALS Student Law Review  | Volume 2, Issue 1, Autumn 2014 Special Issue: Law Reform and Child Protection  | Page 53 
 
functions are generally common to law commissions throughout the Commonwealth and in other 
jurisdictions (such as the Republic of Ireland) which have adopted the law commission model. 
I would understand these are the generally common features: 
 Chair and commissioners appointed by government for fixed terms of years: commonly 3 or 5 
years with sometimes provision for re-appointment; 
 The commissions are to be independent of government; 
 There must be proper arrangements for financial accountability; 
 Their work is generally carried out under ‘Programmes of Law Reform’ setting out for a term 
of years (such as three or five years) a programme of topics of law reform to be tackled in the 
period; 
 Generally, these programmes require the consent of government  - through the sponsoring 
department such as the Department for Justice; 
 Public consultation usually takes place before a programme of work is published; 
 In carrying out the work the commissions will engage in their own research and in extensive 
consultation on each topic in the programme; 
 This usually involves a consultation paper and possibly other discussion papers and other 
modes of engaging with those having any interest in the topic; 
 Ultimately, the commission will produce a report containing its review of the topic and its 
recommendations for reform and often a draft bill setting out how the reforms might be 
effected in legislation; 
 It is then for government to decide whether or not to implement the recommendations: each 
commission strives for a successful ‘implementation rate’;  
 As well as carrying out the programme topics commissions may also accept references from 
government departments of other topics where law reform is thought appropriate; 
 Some commissions also engage in programmes of consolidation of legislation and repeal of 
redundant legislation; 
 
In the larger commissions such as the Law Commission for England and Wales there are full time 
commissioners who take ‘career breaks’ from their academic or professional careers for the duration 
of their appointments as Commissioners. In the smaller commissions such as NILC this may not be 
possible; the Chairman and Commissioners in NILC have all been part time appointments. 
Whether or not the Commissioners are full time, another important element in all commissions is 
the research team: generally there is a full time, permanent cadre of researchers and sometimes for 
particular projects individuals with special expertise may be engaged for the duration of the project. 
Generally, a Commissioner will lead a project with a team of researchers working with him or her 
and good working relations are of course essential to the success of each project. 
 
3. NILC’s work 
To date the work of the Commission has included: 
 A major project of reform of Northern Ireland’s Land Law4; 
 Reform proposals for aspects of Northern Ireland’s business tenancy protection law5; 
 Proposals for protection for vulnerable witnesses in civil litigation6; 
                                                          
4 NILC 8 (2010) 
5 NILC 9 (2011) 
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 Proposals for reform of bail law in criminal proceedings in Northern Ireland7; 
 Report on Unfitness to Plead8; 
 Review of law on apartments in Northern Ireland9. 
 
In addition, the Commission has worked with the Law Commission in London and the Scottish 
Law Commission on the Regulation of Health Care Professionals10 and is currently working with the 
other Commissions on the reform of electoral law for the United Kingdom. 
The other major current project of the Commission is a review of defamation law in Northern 
Ireland: in particular to consider if the reform proposals of the Defamation Act 2013 should be 
extended to Northern Ireland. 
The question may be raised, whatever the merits of these projects, does the law reform have to 
be carried out by a law commission: for instance previously in Northern Ireland (see further section 5 
below) the law reform function was performed without benefit of a law commission as such?  I 
consider this further in my concluding sections, but first set out the current, rather parlous position of 
NILC and then some of the historical background. 
 
4. The current position of NILC 
In 2012 the Commission underwent a Quinquennial Review which was carried out on behalf 
of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. The Review was, of course, independent of the 
Commission. The Review was known as the ‘Hunter Review’ after the senior retired Northern Ireland 
civil servant who carried it out. Mr Hunter completed his Report and sent to the Department at the end 
of January 2013, but it has not yet been published. The Department has not yet issued any statement 
as to its plans for the future of the Commission. In a written answer on 18 April 2014, to a question 
raised by a member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Minister of Justice announced that a 
business case had been prepared following consideration of a number of options for the 
Commission’s future and that he hoped to be able shortly to agree a way forward and to make the 
necessary announcement. However, no such announcement has yet been made. 
Unfortunately also, the post of Chairman and three of the Commissioner posts have not been 
filled in the same period of time11. In a further Assembly reply on 18 April 2014 the Minister stated that 
he had determined that the posts should not be filled until the decisions had been taken as to the 
Commission’s future. So currently the Commission faces an uncertain future with only one 
Commissioner in post. 
Thus, although some important law reform work is currently on going, the Commission is an 
unfortunate state of limbo at the moment. Indeed, the question arises should the DoJ perform its 
statutory functions of making appointments of Chair and Commissioners under the 2002 Act, rather 
than constant deferment of such appointments? 
However, the DoJ, along with other Departments of the Northern Ireland Executive, is under 
severe budgetary constraints currently, and the Minister has warned that serious cuts in services will 
have to be made. It is quite likely, therefore, that no announcement in regard to the Commission will 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 NILC 10 (2011) 
7 NILC 14 (2012) 
8 NILC 16 (2013) 
9 NILC 17 (2013) 
10 NILC 18 (2014) 
11 Furthermore, there is currently no Chief Executive in post. An ‘ Interim Chief Executive’ was appointed in May 
2014 on a part time basis – see www.nilawcommission.gov.uk (accessed 19 September 2014) 
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be made until the Department is in a position to announce its budget decisions, and the future of the 
Commission may well be influenced by the need for stringent economies. 
Nevertheless I still believe there is value in the law commission model of law reform and in 
the remainder of this article I go on to stet out my reasons. I start however, with some explanation of 
the history of law reform in Northern Ireland. 
 
5. The history of law reform in Northern Ireland 
Law reform in Northern Ireland (on any institutional basis) goes as far back as 1965 when the 
Office of Director of Law Reform was instituted within the (then)  Ministry of Home Affairs12.  
The Office of Law Reform within the Department of Finance and Personnel followed in 1974 
(after short term arrangements for the 1973 power sharing administration). The Office then continued 
until the formation of the Commission in 2007. The Commission took over some of the staff of the 
Office and others went to the Departmental Solicitors Office (which acts for the Departments of the 
Executive) and elsewhere in the Northern Ireland Civil Service. 
An earlier development (the initiative for which came from the Law Society of Northern 
Ireland) was the formation of the Law Reform Advisory Committee for Northern Ireland (‘the Advisory 
Committee’) in March 1989 chaired by a High Court Judge, with volunteer members from both 
branches of the legal profession and the universities and with a secretary and some research and 
administrative services from the Office of Law Reform. 
Some further historical detail is contained in the Research Report by Professor Brice Dickson 
and Michael Hamilton in March 2000 Re-forming Law Reform in Northern Ireland forming part of the 
Review of Criminal Justice.13. 
So it may be thought that the institution of NILC in 200714 was a ‘re-forming’15 of the law 
reform institutions of Northern Ireland: that NILC subsumed the role and duties of both the Office of 
Law Reform and the Advisory Committee, and that the main institutional change was that it was under 
the wing of and reported to firstly the Northern Ireland Office and then, on the devolution of policing 
and justice, to the DoJ in place of these roles being carried out by Department of Finance and 
Personnel. 
My thesis is that such view fundamentally mis-understands the particular role that should be 
performed by a law commission as such, as compared with other institutional arrangements for law 
reform such as prevailed in Northern Ireland from 1965 to 2007. 
 
6. Why have an independent Law Commission? 
The other jurisdiction on the island of Ireland has enjoyed an independent law commission for 
now almost 40 years, as the Irish Law Reform Commission (‘ILRC’) was formed in 1975. In 2005 on 
its 30th Anniversary the former Chief Justice the Honourable Mr Justice Ronan Keane delivered a 
paper considering and celebrating the work of ILRC over that 30 year period. 
                                                          
12 This was in response, I understand, to the creation in 1965 for Great Britain of the Law Commission and the 
Scottish Law Commission. Ireland followed some ten years later with the creation of the Law Reform Commission 
of Ireland – based largely on the GB law commission model. 
13 See further Chapter 2 of the Report 
14 NILC was then constituted but did not commence public operation until March 2008 on the appointment of the 
Commissioners 
15 Note carefully the hyphen in the title of the March 2000 Report 
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However, he commenced by considering the nature and function of successful law reform bodies: 
“First they must be independent of government. A body which is simply another branch of the 
executive will inevitably be perceived as being concerned with implementing whatever may be 
government policy at any particular time rather than bring forward proposals for law reform 
which, viewed objectively, can be seen as in the interests of society as a whole.”16 
It seems to me that this is the mark which should distinguish NILC from the Office of Law Reform and 
the Advisory Committee. The point may well be made that both those bodies did distinguished work of 
benefit to Northern Ireland and that no-one can point to any partisan or other activity subservient to 
government on the part of either body. I agree. But it must be noted that both the Office and Advisory 
Committee carried out most of their work during the long regime of direct rule in Northern Ireland: a 
time during which the attention of local politicians was properly directed to other fundamental matters. 
So in my view the Office of Law Reform/Advisory Committee model will no longer run effectively with 
directly elected Members in the Northern Ireland Assembly and Ministers in the Northern Ireland 
Executive, all with party manifestos and political policy commitments to implement. I return to this 
point later. 
It may also be observed that Office/Advisory Committee dealt largely with matters of law reform that 
might be termed ‘lawyers law’ and I turn to this in the next section. 
 
7. What is the nature of independent law reform? 
NILC as other law commissions is largely composed of lawyers17 and the question arises as 
to whether at all a law reform body should concern itself with matters of policy or should restrain itself 
to matters that might be described as ‘lawyer’s law’? 
Certainly the Advisory Committee in its First Programme of Law Reform stated that in 
considering its approach (among other considerations): 
“. . .the Committee will concern itself primarily with ‘lawyers’ law’. In accordance with that 
principle its recommendations for reform of the civil law in Northern Ireland will be of a nature 
that can appropriately be put forward by a body of lawyers on the basis of legal principle and 
pragmatic common sense after due public consultation. The Committee emphasises that the 
sphere in which it should operate will be one which is not intended to involve controversial 
policy decisions or value judgments.”18 
This emphasis, it may be argued, was prudent on the part of a body with the most limited of 
resources whose members were all in full time engagement in the law, whether in the judiciary, in the 
profession or in the university. 
However, in the early days of the Law Commission in England and Wales, Mr Justice 
Scarman (as he then was), the first Chairman of the Commission, set out a bolder vision. He referred 
to a recent address by Lord Devlin which:- 
“.  . . drew a distinction between what [Lord Devlin] labelled ‘lawyers’ law reform’ and social or 
political law reform. When the law is changed in order to achieve a new social or political 
                                                          
16 The Keane Paper, p.6 
17 Though NILC has one ‘lay’ commissioner as well 
18 First Programme of Law Reform (LRAC No.1) 1990, p.2 
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objective, this [Lord Devlin] said was not lawyers’ law reform; but when social and political 
objectives are agreed and it is found that the law is defective in carrying them out, this, [Lord 
Devlin] said, was properly described as law reform. If Lord Devlin was arguing for the 
existence of a special world of lawyers’ law, I would respectfully disagree. There is no cosy 
little world of lawyers’ law in which learned men may frolic without raising socially 
controversial issues.”19 
I would also subscribe to the view expressed by Lord Scarman that: 
“  . . . the challenge of law reform is that it can only be successfully achieved by the 
combination of the lawyer’s learning and the social awareness of the community.”20  
We shall have to wait for the publication of Mr Hunter’s Report for an assessment of how successfully 
NILC has carried out this in all its work and in the various Reports so far published.  
 
8. Failure of full acknowledgement of NILC’s operational independence 
However, I am concerned that the DoJ currently does not fully recognise the operational 
independence of the Commission. 
At the heart of relationship between the Department and the Commission is the ‘Relationship 
Document’ (available on the Commission’s website)21. This Document :- 
“ . . . notes and records [NILC’s] overall aims, objectives and targets in support of DOJ’s wider 
strategic aims,22 including in particular: 
 the delivery of a fair and impartial system of justice to the 
community in Northern Ireland; 
 the delivery of justice effectively and efficiently; and 
 the development of the law of Northern Ireland to ensure that it 
remains appropriate, fair and accessible to the community. 
 the rules and guidelines relevant to the exercise of the 
Commission’s functions, and duties; 
 the conditions under which any public funds are paid to the 
Commission; and 
 how the Commission is to be held to account for its performance.”23 
 
It is my personal view that this is a constraint upon the proper exercise of independence by 
NILC. It also misunderstands the relationship of NILC with DoJ and with other Departments of the 
Executive and I deal with that in the next section. 
Reverting to independence, certainly such independence is by no means absolute. The 
Document also quite properly provides as noted above for the conditions for funding for NILC and for 
                                                          
19 Law Reform The New Pattern Lindsay Memorial Lectures at the University of Keele November 1967, London , 
Routledge & Keegan Paul,  p.27 
20 ibid 
21 Accessed 28 August 2014 
22 My emphasis 
23 Relationship Document para 1.1.2 
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NILC to be held to account for its performance (and of course the Hunter Review is part of that 
process). 
But the Document does seem to me to wrongly inhibit the operational independence of NILC. 
For instance, if a (future) Minister of Justice decreed that the ‘fair and impartial system of justice’ 
delivered ‘effectively and efficiently’ required a policy of ‘zero tolerance’ of criminal behaviour my fear 
would be that such Ministerial policy could be wielded  to constrain NILC from project research that 
such a policy was ineffective or (for stated reasons) undesirable. A law commission does not have 
independence, if it cannot perform such challenge function. 
It is the case that the Document is expressed not to alter or detract from any legal powers or 
responsibilities of the Commission24 but it seems to me that these stipulations of the Document are a 
chill factor on NILC’s proper operational independence. 
 
9. The relationship of NILC with DoJ and other government departments 
The position is set out in the Relationship Document: 
“Its corporate governance and accountability fall to the DoJ but the Commission’s advisory 
functions for Northern Ireland law reform are to all the Departments of the Northern Ireland 
Executive and (where appropriate) to Government Departments at Westminster (where any 
proposed law reform relates to an excepted or reserved matter). The Reports of the 
Commission must be laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly (‘the Assembly’) and, where 
appropriate as above, before each House of Parliament.”25 
It may be argued that under section 52 (1) of the 2002 Act (as amended) gives the DoJ the 
dominant role, as NILC must send its Reports to DoJ. But firstly this does not apply to Reports relating 
to excepted or reserved matters26: the Commission must under section 52(3) of the Act send any 
Reports relating to excepted or reserved matters to the Secretary of State. Secondly, there is an 
express statutory duty on the DoJ under section 52(2) of the Act that it must lay before the Assembly 
a copy of each such Report received by it. (There is an equivalent duty on the Secretary of State 
under section 52(4) of the Act to lay any Reports received by her before Parliament.) 
While these are technical provisions, they are important in principle as well as detail. They 
connote that the Reports do not become the ‘property’ of the Minister of the DoJ (or of the Secretary 
of State). Neither has any power to require any amendment before laying nor to ‘bury’ any Report 
without laying. 
This seems to me to be right in regard to the principle of independence (as well of course as 
being the law to be observed). But it also is felicitous in the particular circumstances of the division of 
powers between the Departments of the Northern Ireland Executive (under the power sharing 
arrangements of the Northern Ireland Act 1998).  Given the division of political control among the 
various Departments, it would be incongruous if a NILC Report on, for instance, a matter within the 
purview of the Department of the Environment came under the political control of the Minister for 
Justice by reason of DoJ asserting dominance of control over all aspects of the work of NILC. 
If there are proposals for change in the institutional structures of NILC, I trust that this principle of 
independence from DoJ operational control, and of NILC providing the reform function to all 
Departments (and to Westminster in the case of excepted or reserved matters), will be preserved. 
                                                          
24 ibid 
25 para 1.1.1 
26 Those legislative areas which are still outside the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly 
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That said, I am content that DoJ should perform the co-ordinating role in approval of the Programmes 
of Law Reform as submitted by NILC under the 2002 Act. I also see no reason to alter the general 
financial supervisory role that DoJ performs in regard to NILC. 
10. Concluding note 
I would wish to end as I started with something positive. So I quote from a note taken of what 
I said (in my Commissioner role) at the DFP Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly on 12 
October 2011 
“The remit of the Commission was for systematic law reform. While this involved considerable 
technical expertise in the law it did not imply that law reform was the exclusive preserve of 
technical experts. [Mr Faris] suggested that there are several elements involved in law reform: 
i. Technical expertise 
ii. Thorough research 
iii. Widespread consultation 
 
All this properly carried out should lead to our independent evaluation of how law reform may 
serve society’s needs. This of course necessitates a balancing exercise in regard to the 
various legitimate needs and interests of various sections of society and the community which 
are revealed in the course of the law reform project. 
[Mr Faris] suggested that this meant that the members of the Committee (and the Assembly 
and society generally) had the right to expect from the Commission an independent and 
informed perspective on how the balance should be struck on any law reform issue. He 
confirmed that the Commission would not succumb to any sectional or political lobbying in 
that regard. 
[Mr Faris]  concluded by pointing out that it was ultimately for the elected members of the 
Assembly to make the final decision as to whether or not there should be law reform on any 
particular issue but that in making their decisions the Assembly members should be entitled to 
rely on the work of the Commission being independent, technically sound, the product of our 
widespread consultation and containing our independent evaluation of how the balance 
should be struck on each issue arising in each of our law reform projects.” 
This was my best attempt over four years of service as a Commissioner of NILC to strike the 
right balance between the need in the overall public interest of Northern Ireland for law 
commissioners with operational independence but respecting the democratic mandate of the 
members of the Assembly. 
I do hope it will prove possible to protect the essentials of this model for the future well being 
and development of Northern Ireland’s legal jurisdiction. 
It would in my view be detrimental to Northern Ireland’s legal jurisdiction if we were the sole 
jurisdiction within the United Kingdom and Ireland (and within the Commonwealth) to water down the 




(former Commissioner of the Northern 
Ireland Law Commission) 
